The manufacture of automobiles and components in the UK West Midlands reached its peak during the two decades after the Second World War. In the following four decades, despite the overall growth in world sales, there has been a steady decline both in the numbers of vehicles produced and overall employment as local industry found itself unable to cope with overseas competition brought about by the opening of world trade through GATT and then, latterly, by the UK's membership of the European Single Market. Over this same period a succession of both national and regional policy measures have been spectacularly unsuccessful. Initiatives such as the government supported merger of independent producers to form of the British Motor Corporation in the 1950s, the use of the planning laws to encourage green field development away from the region in the 1960s, the nationalisation of the (then) British Leyland in the 1970s, the support for FDI by Japanese manufacturers in the 1980s and the Rover-centric Accelerate project in the 1990s have all tended to mirror and/or exacerbate the problems of short-termism and poor practice. Since early 2000, regional policy has been under the stewardship of the local Regional Development Agency, Advantage West Midlands. Rather than simply seeking to preserve existing policy, the RDA has latterly adopted new policies to support niche manufacturing and high value engineering and to align the regional knowledge base with the search for sustainable solutions to environmental and congestion issues. The new strategy moves away from traditional support measures based on the needs of big companies or 'champions' and instead adopts a devolved approach centred on a mix of small and large businesses and high level research, and -arguably -towards an 'open innovation' approach. In this article we examine these new policy measures and their potential to create a new innovative and competitive environment in the region.
Introduction
In the course of its history the automotive industry has on several occasions set the paradigms for analysing industrial organisation, including assembly line production (Ford), and -arguably -'lean production' (Toyota) .
ii In the past four decades, further radical changes have affected the entire value chain, from manufacturers and suppliers to service providers and dealers (Chanaron 2004, MacNeill and Chanaron 2005; Womack et al 1990) .
The main drivers have been the pressures of cost recovery and intense competition which, together, have driven scale economies, the outsourcing of 'non-core' activities and the gradual inclusion of a range of high value electrical, electronic and communications components where cost recovery is more readily attained. In addition, increasing regulatory pressures (and consumer demands) -for example on the environmental front -have led to the development of new technological developments such as the search for more efficient powertrains as well as a drive for efficient alternative propulsion.
In contrast with expected 'life cycle' models of industry development, the 'crisis of cost recovery' has intensified over time . As a result, large scale production over different models and brands using a platform sharing approach has been adopted to generate the cash for future model development. Simultaneously, major manufacturers are developing assembly operations in low cost locations such as Central and Eastern Europe, or the southern states of the US. The industry is now confronted with further major and profound challenges (Maxton and Wormald, 2005) . The financial crisis has exposed the business model and financial position of most companies as fundamentally weak; profit margins are low and the need for scale efficiency has led to over-investment in production capacity , now exacerbated by the global recession. During 2009, compared to 2008, both private and fleet sales have fallen in all major 'developed' markets. Even in the 'auto-boom' areas of Central and Eastern Europe, India and China the same picture is evident.
The industry is ill-equipped to face this economic crisis. Recently the CEO of FIAT, Sergio
Marchionne, expressed doubts that all companies could 'go it alone' and proposed that the minimum scale for a volume producer will be around 5.5m vehicles per annum suggesting a further round of consolidation and/or strategic alliances to share costs. Vehicle producers will seek more cost cutting and expect more parts to be made in low cost regions with 'knock-on' effects in the supply industry. This will have a further negative effect on companies and jobs with many smaller suppliers, who have little cash reserves, becoming particularly vulnerable.
As liquidity runs short many will face bankruptcy -perhaps between 10 and 20 percent.
iii In addition, political and consumer pressures are forcing a re-assessment of the accepted thinking on vehicle construction, technology and marketing. Thus, there are, potentially at least, a number of major changes in the pipeline that may influence the industry's development over the next decade. For the policy community such changes present the challenge of maintaining support for production while adopting policies appropriate to a rapidly changing economic and political environment. Our case study focuses on the automotive industry in the UK West Midlands, one of the 'old' automotive regions in Europe where recent years have seen the decline of the region's once dominant volume production.
We observe a parallel development towards a form of 'open innovation' model that may have wider applicability beyond the current recession. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines innovation challenges in the auto industry and the variations across innovation systems in different regional and corporate settings; section 3 details the auto industry in the UK and the West Midlands; section 4 moves on to look at the industrial and regional policy framework and how policy has developed to meet both the changing situation of the UK industry and the environmental challenge; section 5 then looks at possibilities for a shift towards an open innovation system where trust and reciprocity might replace the prevalent hierarchical model. Some conclusions round off the paper.
Innovation Challenges in the Auto Industry
Production is dominated by the vehicle makers, or OEMs, with the largest 10 of these accounting for some 75 % of world output. These firms rest at the centre of a matrix of upstream supply (as oligopsonistic purchasers) and downstream distribution and sales (as oligopolistic sellers). In consequence they have controlled the industry's innovation model which for the most part is 'top down' -i.e. hierarchical -and proprietary with closed
interfaces and few open areas where independents can easily plug in (Jürgens, Blöcker and MacNeill, 2008) . Only in very limited cases are supplier brands apparent to consumers. As observed two decades ago by Pavitt, (1984) and more recently by authors such as Cooke et al (2007) , in reference to the knowledge economy, the automotive sector is a mature industry, dominated by large companies and, therefore, not regarded to be at the cutting edge of innovation or economic growth. Thus, for the most part, innovation is incremental and process oriented. These features reflect the socio-economic maturity of the market, where companies are risk averse, and the need to extract maximum returns from production under the 'lean model' (Womack, et al 1990) of squeezing resources and continuous improvement (or cost cutting); the so-called 'QCD' (quality-cost-delivery) challenge.
iv Thus, the industry has tended to be conservative in its approach. Nevertheless the need for cost recovery has driven a great deal of technological change such as the inclusion of electronic control devices which have made vehicles more fuel efficient and improved both safety and reliability. However, the rise in oil prices, concerns over global warming and, more recently, the financial crisis have led governments and consumers to seek fuel economies and vehicles with lower emissions and higher levels of environmental sustainability, thereby presenting major challenges to the industry. The $50bn+ of funds offered to support the US car makers through soft loans and Chapter 11 over [2008] [2009] variant to the hybrid concept where batteries can be charged from mains electricity and/or a conventional engine but the drive to the wheels is 'all electric'. An alternative is the 'mild'
hybrid which employs a starter-generator device in the driveline to utilise regenerative braking energy.
Another 'conventional' way to reduce fuel use is by weight reduction through the use of lightweight Al/Mg alloys and increased use of plastics. More radical or long term changes include a possible move to full electric vehicles where the drive is entirely by electric motors powered by batteries. Even more radical is to switch to using hydrogen as the main fuel source. However, despite its potential environmental benefits, there are major challenges associated with the production, distribution and storage of hydrogen. It is also clear that the total life cycle emissions (LCEs) may be higher or lower than conventional petrol and diesel depending on the mode of production of hydrogen.
Innovation Models in the Auto Industry
Such innovations, of course, cannot take place in isolation. That innovation is a systemic process, based on a series of networked interactions and institutional learning, stems from the writings of authors such as Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993) , and Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) . That innovation systems could be characterised at regional level was first proposed by Phil Cooke (1992) . Subsequent writings have further defined the concept (see Cooke, 1998) . Thus national and regional innovation systems, related to the automotive industry, can be divided between those closely connected to company headquarters where new knowledge is produced, and innovation is developed, and those in 'branch plant' countries or regions that are primarily users, rather than producers, of knowledge and therefore innovation followers). v In the latter the innovation system is geared to incremental process improvement with networks aimed at cost reduction. New, radical, change is controlled by gatekeepers outside the region, or the country, in question. Here relationships between the players tend to be old fashioned and adversarial and based on asymmetries of power and knowledge (Bathelt andTaylor, 2002) . Innovation systems tend to be reactive and reflect a production system being for the most part closed, proprietary and dominated by a small number of large transnational companies. By contrast systems that are more pro active are characterised by high levels of trust and reciprocity. Cooke (1998) period, there is a challenge for policy to be geared to the transition.
The Auto Industry in the UK and West Midlands
The motor industry continues to be an important part of the UK economy. In 2007, there were more than 3000 businesses, a total manufacturing workforce of 180,000 and overall GVA in excess of €11,000m (BERR, 2007) . Although overseas ownership makes the UK industry vulnerable to global decisions on cost cutting, and the re-location of production, there are a number of plus points. It has brought major investment, and the innovative capacity of UK engineering is still strong. In addition, the UK has a major concentration of high value automotive design and engineering businesses. It is also the centre of a major motor sport cluster, with most of the major teams in Formula 1 being located in 'Motor Sport Valley' (Pinch and Hendry, 1999) , an area stretching across the southern half of England. The 'Valley' has around 4000 businesses, (Malmberg and Maskell, 1997) .
For the KIBS and niche sector, however, the knowledge balance is rather different. Here the region is clearly a producer of knowledge since the companies are either knowledge producers per se because they are in the KIBS sector or are able to control their own knowledge flows by virtue of local ownership. Amongst these niche and specialist companies, a significant group is the 'Niche Vehicle Network'. This comprises some 25 specialist vehicle manufacturers and engineering services companies, most of which have their origins in motor-sport, specialist vehicle manufacture, engineering KIBS or high technology parts production. The participants are developing particular technologies but are too small to be able to market these in whole vehicles for general sale. Instead the objective is to develop and prototype these for sale or licence to the major companies. Inevitably these will be outside the region or, at least, will be controlled by companies outside the region.
Examples include Zytec's prototyping of the electric drive train for the SMART and a joint venture with Daimler, as well as the firm's development of electric delivery vans and a
prototype fuel cell van being tested by the University of Birmingham as part of the Science City project viii . A more speculative venture is the Morgan Motor Company's venture to develop a hybrid and then a fuel cell powered sports car. One firm which has developed end-vehicles is the Coventry-based electric commercial vehicle manufacturer Modec, which through its joint venture with the US firm Navistar, is set to benefit indirectly from the Obama government's support for green vehicle technologies.
The European and Regional Policy Framework
At the European level three major policy areas impact on the industry. The first is the macro- 
Shifts in Policy Support
Overall, businesses and policy makers in the West Midlands region face a number of issues if the sector is to be retained and developed. Employment costs are high; outsourcing and the flight from high wages and employment legislation in more developed countries will no doubt continue (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski, 2008) . Also, the UK's flexible labour markets make shedding labour relatively easy (Bailey and Cowling, 2006) . The recent economic crisis, with the global drop in sales and production, has brought additional difficulties. In addition, the legacy of the previous age of volume manufacturing is a supply base still geared to volume and a knowledge base where the main expertise lies in traditional mechanical (physics based) technologies which represent a declining proportion of the value of new vehicles and, given the cost pressures of the 'lean manufacturing' paradigm, provide small profit margins.
It is also clear that the environmental concerns of policy makers and the public will impact at regional level. advanced engineering, green technology and motor sport xi replaces high volume vehicle assembly and a supply sector based largely upon low value 'metal bashing'. These changes are consistent with the 'worlds of production model' (Storper and Salais, 1997) . However, the social implications are significant in employment terms. Not only will overall numbers continue to fall, as the existing supply matrix continues to shrink, the traditional networks based on a strong tacit understanding of the 'old' automotive paradigm cannot immediately evolve into 'new' high technology networks with higher inputs of codified (research based)
knowledge. This evolution puts further pressure on a workforce with 'traditional' skills and creates new imperatives for policy makers.
Thus from the preceding analysis we can identify a shift in local knowledge requirements (a regional knowledge dynamic), as the local automotive sector moves away from volume production, and the traditional knowledge of manufacturing (process) technologies, towards a new higher technology knowledge base in vehicle (product) technologies and low carbon (green) technologies. However, the new paradigms described here may shrink the supply matrix given the higher value added of the technologies and processes involved -i.e., a move away from largely cost-based competition. Linkages to other regions in the UK and other European countries are essential for such components as electric motors, electronic control units (ECUs) and fuel cell technologies.
In Cranfield Universities (hybrid technologies). Thus, new technical knowledge is derived from outside the region. However, the policy objective is that it can be anchored in the region, through development, manufacture and testing.
Towards an Open Innovation Model?
As a consequence of the trends described above, regional actors are confronted with managing a major transition. The former volume producers (MG Rover, Peugeot) have closed along with some significant suppliers. However, much of the broad supply matrix is still geared to this former volume production and is seeking new customers and a diversified product range. Until recently most local policy spending was geared to the retention of this segment of the industry but over the last five years, or so, a policy shift has occurred. Now, as well as concentrating on process improvement, private and public actors are trying to develop new generations of technology -such as low carbon vehicles and telematics. The current crisis, and the political pressures that have followed, may, arguably, be giving further impetus to these efforts with the promotion of more environmentally friendly vehicles and more sustainable business models.
The Niche Vehicle Network is one manifestation of this new direction. Its attempts to develop new technologies through a network of small and medium sized companies can be compared to the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003) as illustrated in Figure 2 below.
As Chesbrough has noted, "open innovation is a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology" (ibid). In this sense, the boundaries between firms and their 'external' environment become more permeable, with an easier flow of innovations in and out of firms. In essence, where knowledge is widely distributed, firms cannot just rely on their own innovative activities: they can and should access patents and processes from other firms, whislt also allowing their own unused innovations to be utilised externally through licensing, spin-offs and joint ventures (Chesbrough, 2003a ).
Chesborough 's earlier (1996) work also looked at the appropriate organisational form required where innovations could be autonomous or systemic, and whether the capabilities firms need exist internally or externally. In this regard, policy needs to recognise the technological paradigm shifts taking place and adapt accordingly. An interesting analogy is with technology policy in the US. Here, there has been the use of a hidden but de facto industrial policy via the Pentagon and other areas of government in terms of the procurement and stimulation of high-technology products over many years, including computers, aerospace and semi-conductors (Geroski, 1990 ) and more recently dual-use flat-screen technologies (US Congress, 1995 (Geroski, 1990) . This would seem key in the OI approach; stimulating and maintaining a range of diverse actors with diffused strategic decision making. To what extent large firms outside the region still control the direction of innovative activities and how far they can control smaller innovative firms is also a key question for policy in attempting to stimulate an OI approach.
Conclusions
The traditional base of low to medium technology manufacturing in the West Midlands region has seen the development of a Regional Innovation System (RIS) dominated by external influences and geared to incremental process innovation. However, the West Midlands
Region's Economic Strategy (AWM, 2007) makes clear the intention to reduce the region's dependence on low value added industries and to concentrate on areas that offer growth potential. Economic actors in the region are thus seeking to re-invent the region as a leader rather than a follower of technology.
Until very recently, regional policy towards the automotive sector was geared to the topdown influences of the prevalent lean manufacturing paradigms, and the short-term needs of a small number of large companies dominated the agenda .
However, the latest policy for the sector seeks to adapt policy to the changing regional circumstances of the industry and the demise of volume car production. The RDA's support for the Niche Vehicle Network seems to be shifting at least towards an open innovation model, or at least an innovation system with OI elements.
Such a model may be a portent of a general trend as the industry globally struggles to adapt to the changing political economic circumstances in which the existing production paradigms are being questioned by politicians and the public alike. Such models are already prevalent in other industries such as pharmaceuticals, and may ultimately replace the closed, proprietary and cumulative knowledge dynamics currently prevalent. That is not to say that the vehicle makers will no longer control the supply matrix through their ownership of brands and direct interaction with vehicle purchasers. There are indeed limits to 'openness'. It is also clear that conventional production modes will persist for some years to come -because of scale, resources, and the 'lock in' of the existing technological paradigm.
Yet times of economic uncertainty and recession have been argued to create opportunities for leaps in innovation and technological break-throughs as the scramble for survival triggers new ideas and creates new forerunners. Indeed processes of 'creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1943) can redesign the map of competitors' strengths and weaknesses. If there is to be such a change, the model emerging in the West Midlands and other locations is worthy of examination. Small companies can often be more innovative than major multinationals. It is notable in this context that Daimler has decided to work with the West Midlands based company Zytec for electric vehicle development. The implications for policy arising from a possible shift towards an OI approach also need further examination. Here we have highlighted just one aspect of policy -the need to foster a diverse range of actors with diffused strategic decision-making, in contrast with the 'top down' and hierarchical nature of the 'old model'. Assuming that an OI approach is possible in a regionally based innovation system, further research on the policy implications of such an approach is called for.
hierarchy". This confirms earlier work by Cantwell and Iammarino (1998) , which found that transnationals' networks for innovation and location choices across the EU conform to a "geographical hierarchy of centres", where the "technological specialization of foreign-owned affiliates" in different regions also depends on the position of that region in the hierarchy Coates 1996) . On the specific case of the auto industry, Cowling (1986) suggests a somewhat different approach to the now popular view, which is further developed in Coffey and Thornley (2009) . viii Science Cities are a UK initiative whereby certain cities received resources to develop innovation through large scale initiatives linking business and the science base. ix Although it should be noted that as of September 2009 no AAP funding had as yet been forthcoming, and Tata turned down the offer of support given the onerous conditions attached.
x As well as cumulative learning and incremental innovations, radical technological leaps often emerge from idiosyncratic synergies between sectors or clusters. In this context, in the West Midlands, cluster-to-cluster networking between, for instance, aerospace and services, auto and services, aero and auto, medical technologies and serious gaming, could be critical. Enterprises and policy makers arguably need to work harder to exploit the synergies of cross-cluster working. xi Whilst the connection between green technology and motor sport may not be immediately obvious racing is often a test bed for new vehicle technologies. The 'harshness' of the racing environment exceeds that of normal road use and requires durable and high quality components. In addition, fuel efficiency is a clear priority. Until recently, F1 teams have also been able to spend large amount on R&D to gain a competitive edge over rivals. That may change with the push towards a cap on spending in future years to try to retain a 'competitive balance' in the sport in an environment of restricted sponsorship revenues. xii Another interesting case is that of Riversimple LLP, which is developing hydrogen cars in conjunction with the gas producer BOC. Its technological blueprint is open-source, and the enterprise is inviting anyone to develop and add to the technology.
